Remittances, Inflation and Exchange Rate Regimes in Small Open Economies by Ball, Christopher et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Remittances, Inflation and Exchange
Rate Regimes in Small Open Economies
Christopher Ball and Claude Lopez and Javier Reyes and
Martha Cruz-Zuniga
Quinnipiac University, University of Cincinnati, University of
Arkansas
May 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22648/
MPRA Paper No. 22648, posted 11. May 2010 19:04 UTC
 
 
1 
 
 
 
Remittances, Inflation and Exchange Rate Regimes in  
Small Open Economies 
 
 
Christopher P. Ball (Quinnipiac University) 
Claude Lopez (University of Cincinnati) 
Javier Reyes (University of Arkansas) 
Martha Cruz-Zuniga (Catholic University of America) 
 
 
 
 
May 2010 
 
 
Abstract 
 Remittances are private monetary transfers. Yet the rapidly growing literature on the 
subject often ignores the role that exchange rate regimes play in determining the effect 
remittances have on a recipient economy.  This paper uses a theoretical model and panel vector 
autoregression techniques to explore the role exchange rate regimes play in understanding the 
effect of remittances. The analysis considers yearly and quarterly data for seven Latin American 
countries. Our theoretical model predicts that remittances should temporarily increase inflation 
and generate an increase in the domestic money supply under a fixed regime, but temporarily 
decrease inflation and generate no change in the money supply under a flexible regime.  These 
differences are borne out in the data.  This adds to our understanding of the true effect of 
remittances on economies and suggests that other results in the literature that do not control for 
regimes may be biased.   
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I. Introduction 
 Remittance flows are large, growing, and important for many economies. Beyond the 
increase in absolute terms, remittances have gained in importance relative to other flows. Indeed, 
Figures 1 and 2 show that remittances exceed foreign direct investment for many countries. 
[INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2] 
Central banks in recipient countries struggle with how best to deal with these flows while 
researchers try to understand their effects in general.  The critical questions involved turn on 
whether these flows are inflationary, pro- or counter-cyclical, and whether or not they generate 
relative price changes, causing a reallocation of domestic resources.  
The recent debate about the effects of remittances mostly focuses on the real terms of 
international trade. Many papers such as Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004), Bourdet and Falck 
(2006) and Lopez, Molina, and Bussolo (2007) reach the same conclusion: remittances have an 
inflationary effect and lead to a real exchange rate (RER) appreciation (a.k.a., “the Dutch 
disease”). Others, such as Rajan and Subramanian (2005), focus on foreign aid and growth and 
argue that regimes should only matter in the short run (i.e., for transition paths). Hence, they 
agree with the previous studies and report that, in the long run, real exchange rate appreciates for 
both regimes.  
The literature offers a consensus regarding the impact of remittances on the exchange rate 
and inflation. Yet, all the studies previously cited assume that the countries follow an unchanged 
exchange rate regime. Table 1 reports the regime changes for the countries of interest and  shows 
that such an assumption is rather strong: each one has observed at least one change in regime for 
the periods considered. Caceres and Saca (2006) is the only study that explicitly controls for 
changes in the exchange rate regime when studying the impact of remittances. They focus on El 
Salvador’s economy while the country remains in a fixed regime and their findings confirm the 
inflationary effect of remittances. Although it is common for studies to assume a flexible regime 
in discussing theory and intuition, none of the empirical work has focused solely on flexible 
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regime. Ignoring the exchange rate regime and its potential changes may very well lead to 
spurious results.  
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
Other works, such as Acosta, Lartey, and Mandelman (2007), and Jansen, Naufal and 
Vacaflores (2007) use dynamic stochastic general equilibrium analysis to investigate the effect of 
a change in remittances on an economy.  Again, they assume no change in the exchange rate 
regime. Hence, the calibration of their model may be cause for concern as it focuses on countries 
that, as shown in Table 2, display changes in regimes for the periods considered. Similarly, 
Chami, Cosimano, and Gapen (2006) investigate the optimal monetary and fiscal policy response 
to remittance inflows under a flexible regime. However, they calibrate to US data since the 
Korean War (i.e., 1955 – 2005) which include both a fixed and floating regime. Hence, it is not 
clear if their predictions would be robust to a calibration solely based on the regime initially 
assumed when deriving the model. 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
The present paper explicitly includes the exchange rate regime when analyzing the 
impact of remittances. It differs from Lartey, Mandelman, and Acosta (2008)  in that it focuses on 
the monetary nature of remittance inflows.1  
The theoretical section derives, under different regimes, clear predictions regarding the 
effects of remittances on inflation and nominal money supply. It shows that under a fixed 
exchange rate regime, increased remittance flows temporarily increase the rate of inflation and 
the nominal money supply. In contrast, under a flexible regime, increased remittance flows 
temporarily decrease the rate of inflation but do not have any impact on the nominal money 
supply. Note that, while the first results are consistent with Caceres and Saca (2006), the latter 
results are at odds with most of the literature’s findings.  
                                                 
1 Lartey, Mandelman, and Acosta (2008) focus solely on understanding the real exchange rate appreciation that often results from 
remittance inflows.  In doing this, they consider the role of exchange rate regimes in affecting the path of the real exchange rate.  They 
focus on the actual production of traded and non-traded goods in the economy and employ annual disaggregated (by sector) 
production data.  
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The empirical section investigates whether there is any evidence of the theoretical 
predictions using yearly and quarterly data for seven Latin American countries. The impulse 
response functions (IRFs) derived from the panel vector autoregressive analysis support the 
predictions. They are robust to the estimation of different models and show no qualitative 
changes in the IRFs when the models allow remittances to respond to RER changes. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model and its 
predictions. Section 3 focuses on the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
  II. A Monetary Model for Remittances 
The model imagines a representative individual that maximizes utility based on 
consumption of traded and non-traded goods as well as money services. The utility function is 
assumed separable in all of its components and over time. 
 
0
, , log( ) (1 ) log( ) log( )T N T N tt t t t t tU c c m c c m e dt
  

              (1) 
where Ttc , 
N
tc , and tt
t
Mm E
    denote consumption of the traded good and the non-traded 
good, and real money balances in terms of the traded good, respectively.  M is the nominal stock 
of money and E is the nominal exchange rate.  The law of one price holds for tradable goods and 
the foreign price for the traded good is equal to one so E is the price of the traded good. 
 Individuals can hold internationally traded assets yielding the constant world interest rate, 
r, earn income from the sale of traded and non-traded goods, receive/give transfers to the 
government and receive exogenous foreign-currency remittances from abroad.2 This is expressed 
in the following flow budget constraint 
                                                 
2  We assume exogenous remittance flows for a number of reasons.  First, there is no consensus in the literature on how they are 
endogenous with respect to the domestic economy.  Thus, it is not clear how to model endogenous remittances.  Modeling remittances 
as depending positively or negatively on either domestic output or the real exchange rate would reflect a bias that is not founded on 
any empirical or theoretical grounds.   This is similar to modeling a stochastic variable as being uniformly distributed when one has no 
reliable information on its true distribution.  Second, as shown in Section 5, the exogeneity assumption does not drive our empirical 
results. Finally, we are interested on the nominal effects of an increase in remittances and the degree to which exchange rate regimes 
matter in determining those effects.  To that end, why remittances increase is much less important than the increase itself. 
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t t t t t t t t
t t
y ca ra y c i m f
e e
                  (2) 
where Tty  represents the traded good, 
N
ty , the non-traded good, 


N
t P
Ee , the real exchange 
rate, ta , net asset holdings, t , government transfers and, tf , the value of remittances.  PN is the 
price of the non-traded good.  
Production in this economy uses a single input: labor.3 Full employment is assumed 
throughout so that total employment is the sum of the levels in each sector.  Total employment is 
set to unity and tl  represents employment in the traded good sector, leaving 1 tl  in the non-
traded sector.  The production functions in each sector are: 
0 1Tt t ty A l
            (3.a) 
and 
 1 0 1Nt t ty B l             (3.b) 
where At and Bt represent technology parameters and the production functions are concave.   
 Individuals maximize (1) subject to (2), (3.a), and (3.b).  Doing so yields the following 
optimality conditions. 
         T
tc
               (4) 
           1
t
N
t ec
                       (5) 
           t
t
i
m
                (6) 
  11 1t t
t t
t
B l
A l
e

 

               (7) 
                                                 
3   Including labor this way was inspired by Chapter 4 of Carlos A Végh’s manuscript under preparation for his forthcoming book, 
current version (2007).  
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Equations (4) and (5) are the typical consumption equations for optimization.  Expression 
(6) is the optimality condition for real money balances showing that money must vary inversely 
with the nominal interest rate and the marginal utility of consumption.  Equation (7) states that 
the marginal productivity of labor must be equal across the two sectors of the economy, a result 
that follows from assuming perfect labor mobility within the country.  
Combining (4) and (5) yields an expression for the real exchange rate that must hold at all 
points in time. 
1
N
t
t T
t
ce
c


                 (8) 
For later reference, combining (4) and (6) yields an expression for real money demand in terms of 
the traded good, 
T
t
t
t
cm
i

 .          (9.a) 
Likewise, (5) and (6) yield real money demand in terms of the non-traded good 
1
N
t
t
t
cn
i

             (9.b) 
where 


NP
Mn . 
 
i.  Equilibrium Conditions 
Interest parity requires 
     ttt ii  *                   (10) 
where i represents the domestic nominal interest rate, i* the foreign (world) interest rate and, ε, 
the depreciation rate of domestic currency. 
Market clearing in the non-traded goods market implies 
N N
t ty c for all t .          (11)  
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In a perfect foresight equilibrium, traded and non-traded good consumption are both 
constant.  That traded consumption is constant follows from (4).  To show that home good 
consumption is constant requires the real exchange rate also be constant in equilibrium.  We posit 
this here and include a proof in the Mathematical Appendix. Thus, in equilibrium, te e , 
N
ty y , and N Ntc c . 
Government revenue from money creation is given back to individuals via government 
transfer, τ, and this leads to the economy’s overall resource constraint: 
     T Tt t t t tk rk y f c               (12) 
where k is the sum of asset holdings of individuals, a, plus official asset holdings (reserves) of the 
government (central bank), h, therefore k a h  . 
Rearranging and integrating (12) forward yields an expression for the traded good 
consumption in equilibrium. 
0
T Tc rk y f   ,          (13) 
which says traded good consumption depends on the flow of returns from the initial asset 
holdings, the constant flow of remittances and traded good production.  It is known to be constant 
(piecewise linear) by (4). 
Combining (13) and (11) with (8) yields an expression for the equilibrium real exchange 
rate. 
    

 10 fyrk
ye T
N
          (14) 
where yN and yT are given by (3.a) and (3.b). 
ii. Monetary Regimes and Economic Dynamics 
To generate dynamics in this model, we assume that non-traded good prices adjust 
according to a Calvo-type (Calvo, 1983) pricing mechanism. 
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      0  NNtt yc          (18) 
where Ny is the steady state level of non-traded good production and θ is a constant parameter.  
Under this formulation the non-traded good price level is pre-determined at every point in time, 
but the rate of change of the non-traded good price level – i.e., “the inflation rate” – is not.  In the 
short-run, output is assumed to be demand determined so that non-traded goods market 
equilibrium as described by (11) is maintained at all times.4 
    Fixed Exchange Rate Regime (FIX) 
Under a FIX the initial level of the nominal exchange rate, 0E , and its rate of change,  , 
are set by the central bank.  The central bank maintains this regime by adjusting international 
reserve levels (and hence the nominal money supply) endogenously.  By interest parity, constant 
currency depreciation implies that the nominal interest rate is constant in this regime,  *ii . 
By (9.a), in steady state,    where μ is the rate of nominal money supply growth. 
The economy’s behavior is governed by the following two differential equations. 
       1N Tt ty l e c                  (19) 
      )( ttee            (20) 
where    1Ny l B l   .  Thus, changes in the steady state employment allocation change the 
steady state level of non-traded good production.  (19) governs the control and (20) the state 
variable in this economy. 
Result 1. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, an increase in remittances generates an 
increase in inflation.  For a proof see the Mathematical Appendix. 
Result 2. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, an increase in remittances generates an 
increase in the nominal money supply.  For a proof see the Mathematical Appendix. 
                                                 
4   Note that this is actually Calvo's (1983) original formulation which was done in continuous time. 
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[ INSERT FIGURE 3 ] 
Figure 3 is the phase diagrammatic representation of the model under a FIX, the 
dynamics of which are described by equations (19) and (20).  In Figure 3, the economy’s initial 
steady state is at point A.  Since increased remittances always lead to a decrease in the real 
exchange rate (i.e.,the "Dutch disease"), the final steady state must have a lower real exchange 
rate, 


N
t P
Ee .  Under a FIX regime, the nominal exchange rate, E, is constant while an 
increase in home goods prices leads to a fall in e during the transition.  More specifically, the 
initial impact of increased remittance flows is an increase in real money demand.  The central 
bank responds by increasing the nominal money supply to offset the increase in money demand 
and maintain equilibrium in the money market, leaving the nominal interest rate and exchange 
rate unchanged as required by the FIX regime, leading to Result 2.  Upon impact, inflation jumps 
upward to point B, leaving the real exchange rate unchanged.  This generates the home good price 
dynamics necessary to reach the new steady state.  As the economy adjusts to the new level of 
inflows, the real exchange rate and inflation fall continuously which leads to Result 1 throughout 
transition.  In the new steady state, point C, inflation returns to its initial level and the real 
exchange rate is at a lower level. 
 
 Flexible Exchange Rate Regime (FLEX) 
Under a FLEX the initial level, 0M , and the rate of growth of the nominal money supply, 
 , are set by the central bank.  The central bank maintains the regime by allowing the nominal 
exchange rate to adjust endogenously.  By ( )tm m    and 0 m  , it follows that    in 
steady state.  Likewise, constant currency depreciation implies by interest parity that the nominal 
interest rate is constant,  *ii , in steady state. 
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The system’s dynamics are captured in terms of real money balances, of the non-traded 
good,   / Nn M P  , and the non-traded good inflation rate, π.  Under a FLEX, n is a 
predetermined variable since M is exogenous and constant and PN is predetermined.  π remains a 
control variable.  Differentiating the definition of real money balances with respect to time yields 
     )( ttt nn   .      (21) 
Using (8) and (9.a), substitute into (18) for cN and rearrange to obtain 
     1Nt t ty l i n             (22) 
where, again,    1Ny l B l   . 
Result 3.  Under a flexible exchange rate regime, an increase in remittances generates a 
decrease in inflation.  For a proof see the Mathematical Appendix. 
Result 4. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, an increase in remittances implies no 
change in the nominal money supply, by assumption.5 
[ INSERT FIGURE 4 ] 
Figure 4 is the phase diagrammatic representation of the model under a FLEX, the 
dynamics of which are described by equations (21) and (22).  In Figure 4, the economy’s initial 
steady state is at point A.  Since increased remittances always lead to a decrease in the real 
exchange rate (i.e.,the "Dutch disease"), the final steady state must have a lower real exchange 
rate, 


N
t P
Ee .  Under a FLEX regime, the nominal exchange rate, E, jumps to its new, lower 
steady state value immediately.  PN, a state variable, is slower to adjust.  The initial impact of the 
increased remittance flow is an increase in real money demanded.  Under a FLEX, the central 
bank does not respond by changing the nominal stock of money  which leads to Result 4. The 
drop in the nominal exchange rate clears the real money market in terms of the traded good.  But 
                                                 
5   No formal proof here is needed since Result 4 holds by our assumptions of the flexible exchange rate regime.  That is, we have 
assumed that the central bank holds the stock of nominal money constant and allows the nominal exchange rate to adjust. 
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this leaves the real money balances in terms of the non-traded good, n, unchanged and thus the n-
money market out of equilibrium (relatively to steady state).  To reach the new steady state 
equilibrium in this market, real money balances, 


NP
Mn , must increase during transition. 
Since the nominal stock of money, M, remains constant, the price of non-traded goods must 
decrease.  From a real economy perspective, this comes about because the nominal exchange rate 
fell, lowering returns to producing the traded good and thus encouraging a reallocation of 
resources from traded and into non-traded good production.  This is an increase in non-traded 
good production relative to non-traded good demand and thus leads to a decline in the price of 
non-traded goods.  Graphically, upon impact, inflation jumps downward to point B.  This 
generates the home good price dynamics necessary to reach the new steady state and leads to 
Result 3.  Since the rate of nominal money stock growth is constant, real money balances, n, rise 
continuously throughout the transition.  In the new steady state, point C, inflation returns to its 
initial level and real money balances are higher. 
III. Empirical Analysis 
i. Testable Predictions 
The model predicts that the exchange rate regime matters most clearly for the inflation 
and money supply responses to an increase in remittances. Under a FIX, inflation rises, leading to 
the increase in money supply that offsets the increase in money demand. Under a FLEX, inflation 
falls while the money supply remains unchanged. Finally, the model suggests that, if the 
remittances are purely exogenous, the real exchange rate’s transition path differs according to the 
regime. The real exchange rate should fall with an initial response more pronounced under a 
FLEX than a FIX.  The difference is more subtle than for inflation and the money supply. 
ii. Data Description 
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Our model suggests that the transition paths differ across regimes; hence the frequency of 
the data may matter.  As a result, we consider annual and quarterly data for the CPI, nominal 
money supply (M2), real GDP, RER and remittances. 
The annual data is collected from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
Quarterly data on CPIs, nominal money supplies, and the RER are from the International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics. Real GDP and remittances are from the 
central banks of each country.  The exchange rate classifications are based on Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) as well as IMF (2003.a, 2003.b, 2004.a, 
2004.b, 2005.a, 2005.b, and 2006).6 The period considered is 1980:1 to 2006:4. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study that also uses quarterly data in a panel for 
remittances. Selecting the countries with the most data and that are geographically close, the 
analysis focuses on seven Latin American countries: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador and Mexico. 
The original data is transformed into logarithms. The RER is constructed according to the 
theoretical definition as the nominal exchange rate (national currency per U.S. dollar) multiplied 
by international prices (proxy by U.S. prices) and divided by domestic prices. The nominal 
exchange rate is the market exchange rate at the end of the period.  
A preliminary investigation of the variables demonstrates that they are non-stationary, 
and not co-integrated.7 Hence, our analysis focuses on the growth rates of inflation, real GDP, 
remittances, nominal money supply and on the changes in the RER. The quarterly percentage 
changes reported are annualized percentage changes.   
iii. Methodology   
To account for the variable endogeneity and benefit from the panel setting of the data, the 
empirical behavior of the variables is modeled using the Panel Vector Autoregressive approach.  
                                                 
6   Our final regime classification data is available upon request. 
7   The results are available upon request. 
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The initial econometric model takes the following reduced form: 
tititi uYLY ,,, )(       (23) 
where Yi,t is the 5 x 1 dependent and endogenous vector of variables with 
)]'ln(),ln(),ln(),ln(),ln([ ,,,,, tititititiit tancesremitMoneyRERGDPCPIY  . Γ(L) is a 
matrix polynomial in the lag operator (with Γ(L) = Γ1L+ Γ2L2 +….+ ΓsLs ). ui,t is the model error. 
Since the main argument of this paper is the impact of the different regimes – FIX and 
FLEX – on each variable, we include dummy variables to account for the exchange rate regime 
(Dflex for flexible and Dfix for fixed).8,9 The exchange rate regimes are assumed to be exogenous. 
The econometric model becomes:  
tifixtifixflextiflexti uDYLDYLY titi ,,,, ,, .)(.)(     (24) 
We then derive the impulse response functions (IRFs) from Equations (23) and (24), 
relying on the Cholesky decomposition to orthogonalize the residuals.  To do so, the variables 
must be ordered such that variables placed higher in the ordering have a contemporaneous impact 
on all variables lower in the ordering. Hence, the first variable should be the most exogenous. A 
careful ordering of the variables allows identifying the response of inflation and money supply to 
a positive shock on remittances.  
The theoretical model considers remittances as the most independent of the internal 
conditions of a country while they should have a large effect on the other variables. Although this 
assumption can be questioned based on the Granger Causality Test results presented in Table 3, 
where it can be seen that the nominal money supply, among others, granger causes remittances. 
Other studies, such as The World Bank (2006), have shown that remittances do respond to 
external factors that are independent of the country’s internal conditions and, therefore, not 
considered in our model. These factors include, for example, a reduction in transaction costs in 
                                                 
8   The fixed regime dummy accounts for fixed, pegged and dirty pegged regimes while the flexible regime dummy corresponds to the 
purely floating regime. 
9   In order to avoid any bias due to changes in regime, a regime change is accounted for only if it lasts a least 3 periods. 
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the country where migrants live, tightened security in the sending country which encourages 
migrants, especially those that are undocumented, to remit more, and economic conditions in the 
country where the migrant works. Given that the empirical exercise here is to test for differences 
between the effects that remittances have on the economy under a FIX versus a FLEX, we 
include remittances as the first variable in our ordering, while the ordering of the remaining 
variables differs depending on the exchange rate regime considered. Following our initial 
analysis, and based on the arguments and results  of Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004), we 
consider an alternative ordering where remittances respond to changes in the RER as a check on 
our initial results.  
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
Under a FIX, the central bank must intervene to keep the nominal exchange rate stable. 
Hence, a change in remittances leads to a change real money demand, proxied here by GDP, and 
in the nominal money supply, then, in inflation and, finally, in the RER. The resulting orderings 
are thus: 
)ln(),ln(),ln(),ln(),ln(:2
)ln(),ln(),ln(),ln(),ln(:1
,,,,,
,,,,,
tititititi
tititititi
RERInflationGDPMoneytancesremitModel
RERInflationMoneyGDPtancesremitModel


 
Under a FLEX, the central bank does not intervene.  Hence, a change in remittances leads 
to a change in real money demand (i.e., GDP) and in RER then in inflation and, finally, in the 
nominal money supply. The resulting orderings are:  
)ln(),ln(),ln(),ln(),ln(:4
)ln(),ln(),ln(),ln(),ln(:3
,,,,,
,,,,,
tititititi
tititititi
MoneyInflationRERGDPtancesremitModel
MoneyInflationGDPRERtancesremitModel


 
 
iv. Estimation and Empirical Results   
Since the time dimension (T = 26 and 104) of the panel is larger than the cross-sectional 
dimensions (N = 7), we estimate the system of equations using seemingly unrelated regression 
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(SUR).10  Yet, the consistency of the estimator relies on the absence of fixed effects and serial 
correlation in the error terms. The lag length of each panel is selected so there is no serial 
correlation remaining in the residuals. The SUR estimation and the generalized least square 
dummy variable (LSDV) estimation generate similar results allowing us to conclude that there are 
no fixed effects in the data. 
Both equations (23) and (24) are estimated for each data set, at quarterly and annual 
frequencies. The resulting IRFs, reported in Figures 5 to 10 along with the corresponding 95% 
confidence intervals, show the impact of a change in remittances for the cases of combined and 
dissociated regimes, respectively.  
 The IRFs highlight the behavior of each variable depending on the regime considered 
and the frequency of the data. Table 4.a reports a statistically significant difference in the 
responses of inflation, and money supply to a change in remittances when using yearly data. The 
quarterly data’s responses contrast for the GDP, inflation, money supply and RER.  
Table 4b summarizes the theoretical predictions and our empirical results, for inflation, 
and the nominal money growth rate.  Two of our main results come across clearly here.  First, the 
IRFs under a FIX (FLEX) are robust to the ordering suggested by Models 1 and 2 (3 and 4).11 
Second, the empirical results are consistent with our theoretical predictions, independently from 
the frequency of the data as long as the relevant regime is considered. If not, then the results may 
be spurious. 
A closer look at the IRFs allows a more detailed comparison of the results. Since the 
ordering does not have an impact on the variables’ responses, we report only one set of IRFs per 
regime. Furthermore, our model makes clear predictions regarding inflation and the money 
supply, hence we  focus first on those two variables.   
[INSERT TABLE 4.a. AND 4.b] 
                                                 
10  Bun (2001) discusses in detail the case when T is larger than N. 
11 Similarly, the results are robust to the ordering when the data does not discriminate between the regimes 
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Annual Results, Figure 5, 6 and 7 
Figure 5 shows that, under a FIX, an increase in remittance inflows has a positive impact 
on both inflation and the money supply. More specifically, the impact persists for several periods 
after the shock for both variables.  The impact remains positive for the money supply and 
oscillates between (statistically) positive and (statistically) negative for inflation. In contrast, 
Figure 6 shows that, under a FLEX, the impact of an increase in remittance inflows is negative on 
inflation and positive on the money supply.  
A comparison between both figures highlights key differences in the behavior of the 
variables across regimes: the change in the money supply is much smaller under a FLEX than a 
FIX since the 95% confidence interval is consistently lower. The change in inflation is of 
opposite sign with a stronger and more persistent impact under a FIX than a FLEX.  Finally, 
Figure 7 shows that if the different regimes are not modeled, the dynamics are similar to a FIX 
but with noticeably lesser effects. This result illustrates how important controlling for exchange 
rate regimes is.   
[INSERT FIGURES 5, 6, AND 7] 
Quarterly Results, Figure 8, 9 and 10 
Figure 8 shows that, under a FIX, an increase in remittance inflows has a 
contemporaneous and positive impact on inflation that lasts one period. The response of the 
money supply is also positive but lagged and remains significant for 2 periods.  The real 
exchange rate responds positively on impact.  
Figure 9 reports that, under a FLEX, the impact of an increase in remittance inflows is 
negative on inflation, contemporaneous and positive for GDP and RER but positive and lagged 
for the money supply. Finally, a comparison of both figures with Figure 10, where controls for 
the regimes are ignored, confirms that ignoring the exchange rate regimes can lead to spurious 
results. 
[INSERT FIGURES 8, 9, AND 10] 
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Overall, the inflation and money supply responses to increased remittances agree in 
direction but not in amplitude across the annual and quarterly results.  The increase in frequency 
strengthens the response of the real exchange rate, from non-statistically significant to a 
statistically significant and positive, that varies in amplitude across the regimes.  
Some authors have argued that the different responses of GDP to remittance flows are 
relevant for understanding whether remittances are sent for reasons of benevolence or as 
investment. 12  If they are benevolent, one expects them to be counter-cyclical.  Pro-cyclicality is 
then interpreted as implying investment motives.  Under a FIX, changes in GDP are slightly 
negative or not statistically different from zero, depending on the data frequency. Under a FLEX, 
they are positive or not statistically different from zero, depending on the data frequency. These 
results are also robust to an ordering that considers GDP as the most exogenous variable, 
followed by remittances. Yet, the response of remittances to a change in GDP under a FIX shows 
a small temporary decrease while, under a FLEX, it reports a lagged but also small increase..13 
Hence, our work draws no clear conclusions concerning the role of exchange rate regimes in 
affecting the cyclicality of remittance flows.  
 
v. Theory versus Empirical Evidence and Further Discussion 
Both the annual and quarterly outcomes are consistent with our model’s prediction for 
inflation and the money supply:  
- Under a FIX, we observe a positive change in inflation followed by convergence to the 
steady state. Similarly, the money supply displays a positive change before converging. 
- Under a FLEX, we observe a negative change in inflation followed by convergence to the 
steady state. The money supply displays very small to no change. 
                                                 
12   For an excellent discussion and survey of the literature on this issue see Chami, Barajas, Cosimano, Fullenkamp, Gapen, and 
Montiel (2008). 
13 IRFs are available upon request. 
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The results with respect to the real exchange rate are quite different from the theoretical 
prediction in direction, yet they agree in magnitude, reporting a stronger response under a FLEX. 
The lack of exogenity of remittances in the data sets is a potential explanation. Studies such as 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004) suggest that remittances may in part react to RER 
movements. To explore the role of such reverse causality for our results, we generate a new set of 
IRFs where RER  is the most exogenous variable, followed by remittances and then the other 
variables  in the same order as before.  
Table 5.a confirms that, under the new ordering, the IRFs still statistically differ 
according to the exchange rate regime. The results are similar to Table 4.a except for two cases: 
the response of RER when considering annual data is now different depending on the regime, 
while the money supply response is not when considering the quarterly data. Table 5.b. 
summarizes the dynamic responses of inflation, money supply and RER.14  
[INSERT TABLES 5.a. AND 5.b] 
The responses of inflation and the money supply are robust to the new ordering for both 
annual and quarterly data, but weaker in some cases. However, the RER response changes 
noticeably and becomes either negative and lagged for the annual data under FLEX, or 
insignificant for all the other cases.  While this suggests that reverse causality may exist between 
remittances and the RER, it also implies that assuming exogenous remittances is not driving our 
results for inflation and the money supply.15  
 Our work argues theoretically and empirically that exchange regimes are important for 
understanding the effect of remittance inflows on small open economies.  It is clear that the 
responses of both inflation and the nominal money supply differ across regimes in accordance 
with theory, although this has been largely ignored in other studies.   
                                                 
14  The corresponding IRFs and their 95% confidence interval are available upon request from the authors.   
15   Which is also confirmed by previously reported results using GDP as the most exogenous variable 
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Figure 7 suggests that, at this level of aggregation and frequency, the inflationary effects 
from fixed regimes tend to dominate in the data. This helps explain why works such as Caceres 
and Saca (2006), focusing on countries with a FIX, often emphasize the inflationary aspect of 
remittances, and studies such as Lopez, Molina and Bussolo (2007) focus attention on monetary 
policies to combat the inflationary effects of remittances.  Our results thus hint at the likely 
direction of the bias in the estimates in the literature. 
IV. Conclusions 
 Remittance flows to emerging markets have been increasing in recent years.  For many 
countries, they exceed official flows, including foreign direct investment. The literature on 
remittances has focused on real effects and trade-theoretic models while deemphasizing the 
monetary nature of the transfers. Hence, the potential impact of monetary regimes has been 
mostly ignored. 
In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by analyzing the responses of strictly monetary variables 
such as inflation and the nominal money supply to changes in remittances, under different 
monetary regimes. 
 First, our work shows theoretically how exchange rate regimes matter and makes simple 
predictions.  Under a fix regime, inflation rises leading to an increase in the money supply to 
offset the increase in money demand. Under a flexible regime, inflation falls while the money 
supply remains unchanged. The model also suggests that, if the remittances are purely exogenous, 
the real exchange rate’s transition path differs according to the exchange rate regime as well. 
 Second, our work shows empirically how these predictions hold in the data. Using a 
panel vector autoregressive approach that controls for regime differences, we explore impulse 
response functions specific to each regime and to two different levels of frequency in the data: 
annual and quarterly.  While most studies use annual data, to our knowledge, this is the first study 
to also use quarterly data for a panel with remittances. The predictions for inflation and the 
money supply are borne out in the data, which is not always the case for the real exchange rate 
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predictions. We then investigate the potential for reverse causality between the real exchange rate 
and remittances.  While the results show some evidence of this, the main outcome is the 
robustness of our findings to the variable ordering regarding inflation and the nominal money 
supply. Finally, our results are also robust to orderings that allow remittances to respond to 
changes in domestic output. 
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Table 1. Selected Empirical Studies and Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
1979 - 1998 Number of FIX FLEX 1990-2003 Number of FIX FLEX
Regimes (y/n) (y/n) Regimes (y/n) (y/n)
Argentina 3 yes yes Argentina 3 yes yes
Belize 1 yes no Belize 1 yes no
Bolivia 3 yes yes Bolivia 2 yes no
Colombia 2 no yes Brazil 3 yes yes
Dominican Republic 3 yes yes Chile 2 no yes
Jamaica 3 yes yes Colombia 2 no yes
Mexico 3 yes yes Costa Rica 3 yes yes
Nicaragua 2 yes no Dominican Republic 2 no yes
Peru 2 no yes Ecuador 3 yes yes
Trinidad & Tobogo 3 yes yes El Salvador 3 yes yes
Guatemala 2 no yes
Haiti 2 yes yes
1975 - 2005 Number of FIX FLEX Honduras 3 yes yes
Regimes (y/n) (y/n) Jamaica 3 yes yes
Cape Verde 3 yes yes Mexico 3 yes yes
Nicaragua 2 yes no
Panama 1 yes no
1995 - 2004 Number of FIX FLEX Paraguay 2 no yes
Regimes (y/n) (y/n) Peru 2 no yes
El Salvador 1 yes no Venezuela 3 yes yes
Number of FIX FLEX Number of FIX FLEX
1980s Regimes (y/n) (y/n) 1990s Regimes (y/n) (y/n)
Bangladesh n.a. n.a. n.a. Bolivia 2 yes no
Bolivia 3 yes yes Cameroon 2 yes no
Botswana 1 yes no Costa Rica 2 no yes
Burundi 3 yes yes Egypt 2 yes no
Congo 1 yes no Ethiopia 3 yes yes
Honduras 1 yes no Indonesia 2 yes no
Jamaica 3 yes yes Jordan 3 yes yes
Kenya 3 yes yes Kenya 3 yes yes
Madagascar 2 yes no Mauritius 3 yes yes
Malawi 2 yes yes Morocco n.a. n.a. n.a.
Papua New Guinea 1 yes no Panama 1 yes no
Senegal 1 yes no Philippines 3 yes yes
Sri Lanka 3 yes yes Senegal 2 yes no
Swaziland 1 yes no Sri Lanka 2 no yes
Tanzania 2 no yes Tanzania 2 no yes
Zambia 3 yes yes Tunisia 2 no yes
Rajan and Subramanian (2005)
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004) Lopez, Molina, and Bussolo (2007)
Bourdet and Falck (2006)
Caceres and Saca (2006)
 
Notes: Based on Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) three way classification (Fix, Flex, 
Intermediate).  The only cases where the entire sample wasn’t covered, the countries in question 
had three regimes during the subsample and therefore had three in the overall.  For example, 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) only have data on Cape Verde for 1998 – 2002.  Since 
Cape Verde had three regimes between 1998 and 2002, they must have had three regimes 
between 1975 and 2003 as well. 
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Table 2. Selected Theoretical Studies and Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
1991Q1 - 2006 Q2 Number of FIX FLEX
Regimes (y/n) (y/n)
El Salvador 3 yes yes
post-Korean War (1955 - 2005) Number of FIX FLEX
Regimes (y/n) (y/n)
USA 2 yes yes
1990 - 2004 Number of FIX FLEX
Regimes (y/n) (y/n)
Bolivia 2 yes no
Brazil 3 yes yes
Colombia 2 no yes
Ecuador 3 yes yes
El Salvador 3 yes yes
Guatemala 2 no yes
Honduras 3 yes yes
Mexico 3 yes yes
Panama 1 yes no
Peru 2 no yes
Acosta , Lartey, and Mandelman (2007)
Chami, Cosimano, and Gapen (2006)
Jansen, Naufal, and Vacaflores (2007)
 
Notes: Based on Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) three way classification (Fix, 
Flex, Intermediate). 
 
Table 3. P-values for Granger causality tests 
 
 Inflation does 
not Granger 
cause 
Remittances 
Money does not 
Granger cause 
Remittances 
GDP does not 
Granger cause 
Remittances 
Annual data 
All 0.51 0.02 0.00 
FIX 0.35 0.08 0.00 
FLEX 0.39 0.05 0.11 
    
Quarterly data 
All 0.00 0.03 0.17 
FIX 0.72 0.07 0.32 
FLEX 0.00 0.33 0.12 
 
 
25 
 
Table 4.a. Impulse Response Functions: 
 Statistical difference between the two regimes (FIX-FLEX) 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual data   
T GDP Inflation Money RER 
1 -1.038 9.692 *** 4.730 *** -0.320   
2 -0.522 -1.833 ** 2.760 *** -0.955 
3 -0.892 3.480 *** 2.601 *** -0.507 
4 0.203 -2.865 *** 3.757 *** -0.412 
5 0.292 1.068 2.683 *** -0.119 
6 0.640 0.486 2.962 *** -0.242 
7 0.588 -0.408 0.727 -0.017 
8 -0.003 -2.047 ** -0.229 -0.079 
9 -0.298 -0.077 0.092 -0.075 
10 -0.282 0.338   0.100   -0.067   
 
 
 
Quarterly data   
T GDP Inflation Money RER 
1 2.635 *** 4.455 *** 0.443   1.703 ** 
2 1.839 ** -2.274 ** -1.427 * 0.810 
3 2.067 ** -1.307 * -1.058 0.416 
4 1.370 * -0.977 -0.518 0.550 
5 1.340 * -1.521 * -0.148 1.003 
6 0.680 -1.200 -0.331 0.556 
7 0.507 -0.309 -0.156 0.959 
8 0.347 -0.494 -0.095 0.575 
9 0.245 -0.260 -0.137 0.199 
10 0.163   -0.058   -0.092   0.159   
 
***, **, and * stand for statistical evidence that the coefficients of the IRF 
from the different regimes are different at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
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Table 4.b. Impulse Response Functions summary  
 
 
↑ (↓) stands for an increase (a decrease) significant at a 5% level, and ↔ for no statistically 
significant changes 
 
 
                                                 
16 Osc. stands for oscillating 
  Inflation  Money 
     
Theory  t=0 t>0  t=0 t>0 
FIX  ↑ Convergence 
toward the 
steady state 
 ↑ Convergence 
toward the 
steady state FLEX 
 ↓  ↔ 
       
Annual data 
All  ↑ Osc. decay16  ↔ ↑, decay 
FIX  ↑ Osc. decay  ↑ ↑, decay 
FLEX  ↓ Decay  ↑ decay 
       
Quarterly data 
All  ↔ ↑, decay  ↔ ↑, decay 
FIX  ↑ decay  ↔ ↑, decay 
FLEX  ↓ Osc. decay  ↔ ↑, decay 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Table 5.a. Impulse Response Functions: 
 Statistical difference between the two regimes (FIX-FLEX) 
Reverse Causality 
Annual data   
t GDP Inflation Money RER 
1 -1.074 9.834 *** 4.803 *** NA   
2 -0.716 -1.859 ** 2.833 *** -1.280 * 
3 -1.041 3.631 *** 2.644 *** -0.840 
4 0.200 -2.978 *** 3.778 *** -0.512 
5 0.252 1.102 2.722 *** -0.131 
6 0.626 0.467 2.994 *** -0.213 
7 0.627 -0.410 0.717 -0.129 
8 0.009 -2.126 ** -0.238 -0.141 
9 -0.310 -0.085 0.072 -0.024 
10 -0.281 0.324   0.092   -0.024   
 
 
 
Quarterly data   
t GDP Inflation Money RER 
1 3.263 *** 2.881 *** 1.167   NA   
2 2.720 *** -1.139 -0.564 0.684 
3 3.372 ** -0.862 -0.336 0.719 
4 1.949 ** -2.570 *** -1.165 1.301 * 
5 1.601 * -1.695 ** -0.818 2.078 ** 
6 0.814 -1.973 ** -0.627 1.235 
7 0.558 -0.984 -0.381 1.068 
8 0.320 -0.546 -0.237 0.670 
9 0.239 -0.359 -0.130 0.389 
10 0.155   -0.203   -0.093   0.211   
***, **, and * stand for statistical evidence that the coefficients of the IRF 
from the different regimes are different at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
 
 
28 
 
 
Table 5.b.  Impulse Response Functions summary 
Reverse Causality 
 
 
      
 Inflation  Money  RER 
         
Theory t=0 t>0  t=0 t>0  t=0 t>0 
FIX ↑ Convergence toward the 
steady state 
 ↑ Convergence toward the 
steady state 
 ↓ Convergence toward the 
steady state FLEX ↓  ↔  ↓ 
         
Annual data 
All ↑ Osc. decay  ↔ ↑, decay  ↔ ↔ 
FIX ↑ Osc. decay  ↑ ↑, decay  ↔ ↔ 
FLEX ↓ Decay  ↑ decay  ↔ ↓, decay 
         
Quarterly data 
All ↔ ↓, decay  ↔ ↑, decay  ↔ ↔ 
FIX ↑ Osc. decay  ↔ ↑, decay  ↔ ↔ 
FLEX ↔ ↑, decay  ↔ ↔  ↔ ↔ 
 
↑ (↓) stands for an increase (a decrease) significant at a 5% level, and ↔ for no 
statistically significant changes 
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Figure 1.  Remittances versus Foreign Direct Investment 
 (as percentage of GDP), 2007 
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Source: World Development Indicators (2008). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Top 20 Remittance Recipient Countries 
 (in percentage of GDP), 2005 
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Source: World Bank (2007). 
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Figure 3. Shock Under FIX 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Shock Under FLEX 
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Figure 5. Annual FIX Impulse Responses17 
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Figure 6. Annual FLEX Impulse Responses18 
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17  The IRFs are identical for both orderings – Model 1 and Model 2. 
18  The IRFs are identical for both orderings – Model 3 and Model 4. 
 
 
32 
 
Figure 7. Annual Both Regimes Impulse Responses19 
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Figure 8. Quarterly FIX Impulse Responses20 
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19 The IRFs are identical for all orderings. 
20 The IRFs are identical for both orderings – Model 1 and Model 2. 
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Figure 9. Quarterly FLEX Impulse Responses21 
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Figure 10. Quarterly Both Regimes Impulse Responses22 
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21 The IRFs are identical for both orderings – Model 3 and Model 4. 
22 The IRFs are identical for all orderings. 
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Mathematical Appendix 
 
Most of the proofs in this section rely on one or more of the following equations.  We present 
them here to avoid clutter in the exposition below. 
 
Differentiating (14) yields 
 
(A.1.)  20 01
N
T
de y
df rk y f


   
. 
 
Implicitly differentiating (7) yields 
 
(A.2.) 
     2 21
1 0
1 1 1 1
dl
B Bde l l l l
A A
     
  
  
    
. 
 
(A.1) and (A.2) together imply 
 
(A.3.) 0dl dl de
df de df
  . 
 
Using (3.b) in equilibrium condition (11) and differentiating with respect to remittances, 
 
(A.4.)   11 0Ntdc dlB l
df df
      
 
Since cN increases while the real exchange rate falls, by (15), cT must also increase and by more 
than the increase in cN.  From (13) with (3.a) and using (15) to sign, 
 
(A.5) 1 1 0
T
tdc dlAl
df df
    .    
 
Proof that Real Exchange Rate Is Constant in Equilibrium 
Suppose instead that the real exchange rate increases.  An increase in the real exchange 
rate generates an increase in labor in the traded sector, by (A.2). By (3.b), an increase in l leads to 
a contraction in non-traded good output which, by (11), leads to a fall in non-traded consumption.  
But, by (5), this leads to a contradiction since we can’t have an increase in the real exchange rate 
and a fall in non-traded consumption.  Similar logic holds for a decrease in the real exchange rate, 
proving the proposition that the only equilibrium is one where the real exchange rate is constant. 
 
 
Result 1: Under a fixed exchange rate regime, an increase in remittances generates an 
increase in inflation. 
Proof:  Across steady states the increase in remittances leads to a lower real exchange 
rate, e, by (A.1), to higher traded and non-traded good consumption, Tc  and Nc , by (A.4) and 
(A.5), and thus to higher non-traded good output, Ny , by (11).  On impact, traded good 
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consumption and the steady state level of non-traded good production in equation (19) both jump 
to their new, higher levels.  Since the real exchange rate will be lower in the new steady state, it 
must be that traded good consumption changes by more than the steady state non-traded good 
output.  Starting from steady state and given that the real exchange rate, e, is a predetermined, it 
follows that the right hand side of (19) turns negative upon impact of the shock to remittances.  
For this to hold and for the real exchange rate to reach it’s new, lower steady state level, the 
inflation rate must increase upon impact to generate the necessary dynamics according to (20).  
This is represented in the phase diagram in Figure 1 and proves Result 1. 
 
Result 2: Under a fixed exchange rate regime, an increase in remittances generates an 
increase in the nominal money supply. 
Proof:  This result follows from the central bank maintaining a fixed nominal exchange 
rate.  Rewriting (9.a) as 
T
t t
t t
M c
E i

 .  When remittances increase, traded good consumption 
jumps upward once upon impact by (A.5).  By open economy interest parity (10), the nominal 
interest rate can only change if the foreign nominal interest rate or rate of nominal currency 
depreciation change. Neither have changed and thus the domestic nominal interest rate is constant 
as well.  By the fixed regime, the nominal exchange rate is constant as well.  Everything else in 
(9.a) is a constant parameter.  Thus, the increase in traded good consumption on the right-hand 
side of (9.a) must be offset by an increase in the nominal stock of money on the left-hand side of 
(9.a) for this optimality condition to hold at all points in time.  This proves Result 2. 
 
Result 3: Under a flexible exchange rate regime, an increase in remittances generates a 
decrease in inflation. 
Proof: Across steady states the increase in remittances leads to a lower real exchange 
rate by (A.1), to higher traded and non-traded good consumption, Tc  and Nc , by (A.4) and 
(A.5), and thus to higher non-traded good output, Ny , by (11). Real money balances in terms of 
the non-traded good, n, is predetermined and thus constant on impact.  Likewise, i remains 
unchanged since under the FLEX, the nominal exchange rate jumps to its new level on impact to 
maintain equilibrium in the money market described by (9.a).  The steady state level of non-
traded good production is not constant, however, and jumps on impact to its new, higher level.  
The result is that, the right hand side of (22) turns positive upon impact.  For this to hold and for 
the real exchange rate to reach it’s new, lower steady state level, the inflation rate must decrease 
upon impact to generate the necessary dynamics according to (22).  This is represented in the 
phase diagram in Figure 2 and proves Result 3. 
 
Remittances and The Real Economy: Effects of the “Dutch disease” 
 
 In our model, remittances will always cause a real appreciation and a resource 
allocation á la the “Dutch disease” independent of the economy’s monetary regime.  To 
see this, equate (7) and (14), use (3.a) and (3.b), and rearrange to obtain an expression in 
terms of labor, remittances, and parameters.23  Totally differentiating this shows that 
increasing remittances, f, requires a fall in the amount of labor employed in the traded 
good sector, l.  This is the so-called “resource movement effect”. 
                                                 
23  1 0 01 1t t t t
AB l AB l ra Al f        
                 
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(A.6)  
  2 1 1
1 0
1
1 1t t t
dl
df AB l AB l A l          
  
             
 
 
To see the “spending effect” (i.e., the effect on the real exchange rate), rewrite (7) in 
terms of the real exchange rate24 and differentiate with respect to traded good sector 
labor. 
 
(A.7)       2 111 1 1 1 0de l l l l
dl
     
           
 
which says that an increase in labor to the traded sector increases the real exchange rate. 
Combining (A.6) and (A.7), gives the full “Dutch disease” effect. 
 
(A.8)    0de de dl
df dl df
  . 
 
That is, an increase in remittances always generates a fall in the real exchange rate in this 
economy. 
Furthermore, the income effect from increased wealth in the form of remittance 
inflows leads to an increase in consumption of both goods.  By (A.8) and (8) the final 
change in both levels of consumption must be such that traded good consumption 
increases by more than home good consumption.  Analytically, by (3.b) and (11), 
 
(A.9)      11 0Ntdc dlB l
df df
     . 
 
Again, since cN increases yet the real exchange rate falls, by (A.8), cT must also increase 
and by more than the increase in cN.  From (13) with (3.a) and using (A.8) to sign, 
 
(A.10)    1 1 0
T
tdc dlAl
df df
     
 
which imposes a restriction on the magnitude of the resource allocation effect in the 
traded sector such that 1 1dlAl
df
   . 
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